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INTRODUCTION 
Under Chicago’s Large Lots Program, existing property owners 
can buy up to two vacant residential lots on their blocks for $1 each.  
Lots are mapped on a website developed by DataMade, a civic tech 
developer, and thereafter, buyers can transact seamlessly online.1  In 
return, these new owners are required to pay property taxes and 
 
* Privacy Counsel and Legal Engineer at Immuta. 
** Scott K. Ginsburg Professor of Urban Law and Policy, Professor of Public Policy at 
Georgetown University. We greatly appreciate the insights from Marc Norman 
(Associate Professor of Practice in Urban and Regional Planning, University of 
Michigan). 
 1. See Patrick Barry, Website Helps Residents Buy $1 Vacant Lots, LISC CHI. 
(Apr. 4, 2014), http://archive.lisc-chicago.org/blog/9 [https://perma.cc/CZ95-PUYZ]. 
See generally The City of Chicago Sells Vacant Residential Lots for $1 through the 
Large Lot Program, LARGE LOTS, https://largelots.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/L83H-T6AV] (last visited Feb. 29, 2020). 
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maintain the lot.  This program is part of a larger effort by cities to 
become “smarter” and more efficient through the use of civic 
technology.2 
Vacant lots are a ubiquitous feature of the urban landscape today 
in all kinds of cities (and rural areas), notwithstanding the trend 
towards urbanization.3  Catalyzed by racist policies like redlining and 
blockbusting, many cities like Chicago and its suburbs are still 
segregated by race and class.4  In large part because of “white flight” 
to the suburbs and decades of disinvestment, many African American 
communities (and other communities of color) could not afford to or 
were legally restricted from living in high-opportunity areas.5  These 
large population moves and historical disinvestment left behind 
thousands of vacant lots in core Chicago neighborhoods, equivalent 
to more than 800 acres of vacant land.6  Chicago is not unlike many 
cities across the Rust Belt and the Northeast, where “[w]hat we refer 
to now as ‘vacant land’ is the legacy of racial segregation, redlining, 
and urban renewal, and more recently exacerbated by predatory 
lending, the ensuing mortgage foreclosure crisis, and new 
discriminatory practices in access to credit.”7 
Today, local governments view the divestment and sale of vacant 
or abandoned property as an economic necessity.8  They make 
attempts to place the land back into productive use, usually by 
 
 2. See generally Barry, supra note 1. 
 3. Vacant land constitutes anywhere from 15–20% of older, so-called “legacy” 
cities such as Philadelphia and Detroit, and consists of thousands of vacant lots which 
are often concentrated together in a pattern of “hyper vacancy.” But even so-called 
“magnet” cities — like New York, Seattle, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and 
Washington, D.C. — have their fair share of vacancy, with rates ranging from 5–15%, 
even as these cities experience unprecedented growth. ALLAN MALLACH, THE EMPTY 
HOUSE NEXT DOOR: UNDERSTANDING AND REDUCING VACANCY AND 
HYPERVACANCY IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 4–5, 25 (2018). 
 4. See Whet Moser, New Deal-Era Maps Show Racist Redlining and 
Anti-Density Forces at Work, CHI. MAG. (Dec. 5, 2016), 
https://www.chicagomag.com/city-life/December-2016/Mapping-Inequality/ 
[https://perma.cc/S7Q5-SZUX]. 
 5. See id. 
 6. Dimitriy Leksanov, Community Redevelopment, a Dollar at a Time, CHI. 
MAROON (Jan. 10, 2019), 
https://www.chicagomaroon.com/article/2019/1/11/community-redevelopment-dollar-t
ime/ [https://perma.cc/G4DR-P4T4]. 
 7. Amy Laura Cahn & Paula Z. Segal, You Can’t Common What You Can’t See: 
Towards a Restorative Polycentrism in the Governance of Our Cities, 43 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 195, 201 (2016) (“For decades, municipal and private landowners have left 
acres of land in neighborhoods . . . abandoned in cities across the Rust Belt and in the 
Northeast.”) 
 8. See MALLACH, supra note 3, at 20. 
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acquiring title to these properties through tax foreclosures or placing 
them in a land bank or public receivership until the title is clear for 
transfer to private investors or developers.9  Chicago’s Large Lots 
program, and similar programs, are another way of making sure land 
is put back into productive use. 
For residents in communities with significant amounts of vacant 
land, these parcels are often treated as open access resources, and as a 
community asset.10  There are many examples of residents utilizing 
the lots in ways that add value to the surrounding community and 
which produce goods for that community.11  The construction of 
community gardens or urban farms is one example of this kind of 
utilization.12  These resources become essential for the most socially 
and economically vulnerable communities, as the “public” domain 
shrinks and basic goods for human survival and flourishing are 
increasingly out of reach for so many.13 
While the benefits of selling vacant lots to existing property owners 
are many, this Essay examines the limits of Chicago’s Large Lots 
Program.  In particular, it uses the Large Lots Program as a case study 
to explore how local governments can address inequality through 
different uses of urban vacant land in blighted communities.  We 
examine the program through the lens of the tension that exists 
between “use” and “exchange” value in urban development.  As John 
Logan and Harvey Molotch framed it many decades ago, there has 
long been a tension in urban markets and growth politics, between 
local interests who treat land as a commodity for financial return, and 
those who use land to satisfy the essential needs of everyday life14: 
 
 9. See id. at 37–38 
 10. See Sheila Foster & Christian Iaione, The City as a Commons, 34 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 281, 302–06 (2016). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. See generally Sheila R. Foster, Collective Action and the Urban 
Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 94–95 (2011). 
 13. See Bradley Garratt, The Privatization of Cities’ Public Spaces, GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 4, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/aug/04/pops-privately-owned-public-space-ci
ties-direct-action [https://perma.cc/CCQ9-AG7D]; Tracy Jan, America’s Affordable 
Housing Stock Dropped by 60 Percent between 2010 and 2016, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 
2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/10/23/americas-affordable-hous
ing-stock-dropped-by-60-percent-from-2010-to-2016/ [https://perma.cc/3D23-WAC8]. 
 14. JOHN R. LOGAN & HENRY MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF PLACE 2 (1987) (“For some, places represent residence or production 
site; for others, places represent a commodity for buying, selling, or renting to 
someone else.”); see also Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a 
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“The pursuit of exchange values in the city does not necessarily result 
in the maximization of use values for others.  Indeed, the 
simultaneous push for both goals is inherently contradictory and a 
continuing source of tension, conflict, and irrational settlements.” 15 
The tension between exchange and use value exists today at an 
even more heightened level in large part because urban land values 
are at historic highs.  The total value of America’s urban land is 
estimated to be $25 trillion, roughly more than double the nation’s 
overall economic output or GDP.16  Nearly half the total value is 
packed into just five metro areas: New York, Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, Washington, D.C., and Chicago, with land in and around 
the urban center being the most valuable.17  The rising value of land 
and resulting economic opportunity is concentrated in a relatively 
small group of cities around the world, which has led urban scholars 
to worry about “exclusionary megacities” and “property-centered” 
urban development and growth that privilege developers, existing 
property owners, and speculators to the detriment of non-property 
owners.18 
Chicago’s Large Lots Program arguably aspires to assuage this fear 
by making urban land available for $1 to existing property owners 
within the community where that land is located.  However, what it 
does not change are the underlying dynamics of an exclusionary 
approach to urban land development that is characteristic of the cities 
where economic opportunity is now so concentrated.19  The Large 
Lots program operates, knowingly or unknowingly, to protect the 
interests of existing property owners and to privilege their access to 
available urban land in these communities.  In doing so, the program 
also facilitates the exclusion of individuals from opportunities ushered 
 
Political Economy of Place, 8 AM. J. SOC. 309, 309 (1976) (“[L]and, the basic stuff of 
place, is a market commodity providing wealth and power.”). 
 15. LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 14, at 2. 
 16. David Albouy et al., Metropolitan Land Values, 100 REV. ECON. & STAT. 454, 
454, 459 (2018); see also Richard Florida, The Staggering Value of Urban Land, 
CITYLAB (Nov. 2, 2017), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/11/the-staggering-value-of-urban-land/544706/ 
[https://perma.cc/UZV7-7P55]. 
 17. Id. at 459. 
 18. See Wendell Pritchett & Shitong Qiao, Exclusionary Megacities, 91 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 467, 467–522 (2018). 
 19. See generally ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS (2012); Mark 
J. Perry, Many U.S. Metro Areas Have Greater GDP Than Entire Developed 
Nations, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (Oct. 2, 2018), 
https://fee.org/articles/many-us-metro-areas-have-greater-gdp-than-entire-developed-
nations/ [https://perma.cc/9WUZ-93WC]. 
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in by urban agglomeration, including access to resources within their 
communities that can facilitate their ability to remain and thrive in 
growing cities.20 
In this Essay, we propose reforming programs like the Large Lots 
Program consistent with a framework grounded in land stewardship, 
in which land use is not dependent on ownership, or its market 
exchange value, but rather on one’s (or a collective’s) ability to 
sustainably use land to provide goods and services that support 
adjacent communities.21  In particular, we look to the Co-City 
Framework22, a new urban governance model based on the creation 
and governance of shared and common resources arising out of the 
collective action and active participation of urban communities in 
stewarding land and other resources in their communities.23  
According to the framework, common resources or goods occupy a 
middle ground between public and private resources or property and 
between the state and the market.  These resources can be stewarded, 
even in the absence of title, by an identified group of people or 
community who are vested with the duty of maintaining and keeping 
accessible (or affordable) the resource for future users and 
generations.  As we discuss below, property arrangements such as 
community land trusts and limited equity cooperatives can be vehicles 
for property stewardship consistent with the Co-City framework. 
The Essay will proceed as follows.  Part I offers background on the 
Chicago program and some critiques that have been lodged against it.  
Part II discusses an alternative to ownership-based public property 
disposition: the Co-City Framework.  Part III explores how the 
Co-City Framework might apply to public property disposition in 
Chicago, returning to how the Large Lots Program may be redesigned 
to create and foster collective action and stewardship.  Part IV 
discusses the major challenges of stewarding land in cities with a high 
cost of land and whose purpose of selling lots is to raise large sums to 
finance their operations.  To address these financial barriers, this Part 
 
 20. See Nicholas Blomley, Enclosure, Common Right, and the Property of the 
Poor, 17 SOC. LEGAL STUD. 311, 311–31 (2008) (recognizing the right of the poor “not 
to be excluded” from the property of the city). 
 21. See Foster & Iaione, supra note 10, at 307–08. 
 22. Id. at 345. 
 23. The model or framework of the Co-City is contained in the writings of Sheila 
Foster and Christian Iaione, including their forthcoming book CO-CITIES (2021) 
(MIT Press), their article, The City as a Commons, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 281 
(2016), and book chapter Ostrom in the City: Design Principles for the Urban 
Commons, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE STUDY OF THE COMMONS (Dan Cole 
et al. eds., 2019). 
914 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVII 
explores three general strategies, which include creating incentives in 
zoning and land use laws, encouraging the identification of alternative 
financing sources, and launching strategic partnerships to build 
leverageable assets.  The Essay concludes by raising two policy 
reform proposals that may further scale the Co-City approach. 
I. BACKGROUND ON THE LARGE LOTS PROGRAM 
In March 2014, community organizers in Chicago banded together 
to propose that anyone who owned property on the block should be 
able to purchase a vacant lot for a dollar.24  These organizers built 
strong partnerships through a neighborhood coalition called the 
Green Health Neighborhoods Plan.25  This coalition sought to 
maximize community resources, such as vacant land, left behind by a 
mass exodus from the City over the past half-century.26  Partner 
organizations included the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for 
Planning, the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC Chicago), 
and local officials.27 
This effort came to be known as Chicago’s Large Lots Program, the 
benefits of which are multifold.28  When cities transfer ownership of 
large empty lots to existing property owners in the community, they 
can repurpose the lots for better use.  At least 1250 Chicago lots have 
been sold through this program.29  Many empty, desolate lots, some of 
which had been overrun with trash, sites of illegal dumpings, and stray 
animals, have been transformed into gardens, housing, and public 
parks.30  Better uses, in turn, might mean that the safety of the 
communities in which these lots are located improves.31  These uses 
also provide the kinds of goods and services that many disadvantaged 
and marginalized communities, most often low-income communities 
of color, often lack.  These goods and services can include healthy 
food and vegetables in neighborhoods that are food deserts and green 
or recreational spaces where there are none. 
 
 24. Leksanov, supra note 6, at 3. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Sharita Forrest, Chicago’s Large Lot Program Sowing Change in Inner-City 
Communities, ILL. NEWS BUREAU (Mar. 19, 2019), 
https://news.illinois.edu/view/6367/764165 [https://perma.cc/XL2R-VL72]. 
 29. Nona Tepper, The Collateral Damage of $1 Vacant Lots, CHI. MAG. (Nov. 19, 
2018), http://www.chicagomag.com/city-life/November-2018/The-Collateral- 
Damage-of-Large-Lots/ [https://perma.cc/WY2N-GKJJ]. 
 30. Forrest, supra note 28. 
 31. Tepper, supra note 29. 
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To address concerns that new owners will simply purchase property 
for speculative purposes, the Large Lots Program has two key 
provisions.32  The first is that lots must be held for at least five years 
to prevent flipping.33  The second is that only existing property 
owners can purchase them, thus, in theory, preventing outside 
investors from entering the market.34  Given the success of this 
program, other cities are excited about adopting similar programs.  
For instance, officials from Rochester, Kansas City, and New Orleans 
have inquired about the program and indicated an interest in 
adopting a similar one in their cities.35 
Yet, despite its benefits, the Large Lots Program suffers from at 
least two significant drawbacks.  First, because the program is limited 
to existing property owners, it forgoes the opportunity to expand 
property ownership to residents who have not only lived in 
communities but also have labored to maintain empty lots and to put 
them to productive uses, as identified in the example of Luerlis 
Gutierrez below.  Second, while the program requires purchasers to 
own property on the same block of the vacant lot, it does not appear 
to require purchasers to live on that block.36  Based on our interviews 
with city officials, the reason for the latter policy is that some 
community members own their relative’s home in the neighborhood, 
but do not live on the block where those properties are located, and 
pushed to have access to the program.  One unintended consequence 
of this policy choice, however, is that developers and outside 
speculators are purchasing multiple properties in the area, but 
keeping lots empty.37 
 
 32. Barry, supra note 1. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Robert Channik, 4,000 Vacant Lots on Sale for $1 to Chicago Homeowners, 
CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 28, 2016), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-chicago-large-lots-expansion-1129-biz-20
161128-story.html [https://perma.cc/FRE4-E83X] (citing Peter Strazzabosco, the 
Deputy Commissioner for Chicago). 
 36. Large Lots Program, CHI., 
https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/dcd/supp_info/large-lot-program.html 
[https://perma.cc/39UX-HS2N] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020) (“Up to two lots are 
available per application. Applicants must own property on the same block; be 
current on property taxes; and have no financial obligations to the City, among other 
requirements.”) 
 37. Leksanov, supra note 6 (“Developers who own properties throughout the city 
have begun exploiting these parameters, creating a different kind of vacancy in which 
absentee owners are the lots’ caretakers.”) 
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Luerlis Gutierrez, for example, for years, would excitedly send 
weekly pictures of her garden to her friends back home in Cuba, 
showing blooming flowers and vegetation.38  Over the past decade, 
she and a handful of local neighbors turned an abandoned lot near 
their homes into a vibrant community named Fulton Garden.  Today, 
Fulton Garden has been destroyed, half of it fenced off and cluttered 
with weeds and trash.39  The Large Lots Program sold half of 
Gutierrez’s garden to a local property owner, who also owns three 
properties in the neighborhood that have remained empty.  Citing 
liability concerns, this owner prevented Gutierrez from tending to the 
garden.40  One Fulton Garden member commented, “It’s just like if 
somebody comes in and takes your child away.”41  Chicago Magazine 
also reported that change of ownership under the Large Lots 
Program has destroyed at least two other community gardens, leaving 
those lots vacant and harming the policy goals of the program.42  
Purchases can thus rip apart community revitalization efforts, as was 
the case of Gutierrez’s Fulton Garden. 
To its credit, the City has recognized the risk of the program to 
residents like Gutierrez.  It has also recognized the labor of residents 
like Gutierrez, who have transformed abandoned lots into productive 
uses for the surrounding community.  With assistance from local 
community leaders, Chicago aldermen now place community gardens 
on a “do not sell” list.43  Nevertheless, residents like Gutierrez believe 
this effort is insufficient. Gutierrez argues that the lots for sale 
through the Large Lots Program should be for residents who are 
“sitting in the community, working with the community, engaging the 
community.”44  A community-based leader involved with founding 
the Large Lots Program agrees.  Ivan Cazarin, who worked alongside 
Teamwork Englewood and the City of Chicago, argues that the 
emergence of owners of property next to vacant lots but who do not 
live in the community “undermines the spirit of the program.”45  In 
other words, both Gutierrez and Cazarin believe the Large Lots 
Program should favor those who will steward the property for the 
 
 38. Tepper, supra note 29. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Online Interview with Ivan Cazarin, Chapter President, Roosevelt Inst. at 
Univ. of Ill. at Chi. (Jan 21, 2020). 
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community — instead of purchasers who happen to own property 
locally. 
II. AN ALTERNATIVE TO OWNERSHIP-BASED PUBLIC PROPERTY 
DISPOSITION 
Although an often-cited example of an alternative community 
development model, Boston’s approach to vacant lots is instructive 
for Chicago’s program.  The Dudley Square area, located in the 
Roxbury neighborhood of South Boston, was once one of the poorest 
areas in the Boston metropolitan area with numerous vacant and 
tax-defaulted lots, much like the lots sold pursuant to Chicago’s Large 
Lots Program.46  Through the 1970s, the Dudley neighborhood 
deteriorated due to white flight and the neglect and divestment of 
Boston-area government officials and financial institutions.47  By the 
1980s, over one-fifth of the neighborhood’s land was vacant.  Those 
that remained were largely impoverished Hispanics, African 
Americans, Jews, and other minority groups, which did not have the 
financial option to relocate.  But instead of selling these lots to local 
property owners, the City of Boston transferred ownership of 15 acres 
— about 1300 lots — to a community land trust (CLT).48   Dudley 
Square residents incorporated as a nonprofit (Dudley Square 
Neighborhood Initiative, or DSNI) and embarked on an ambitious 
plan to create an “urban village” that would develop the 
neighborhood without resulting in the displacement of existing 
residents.  On the once-vacant land, the Dudley Neighbors 
community land trust built 225 new affordable homes, a 10,000 square 
foot community greenhouse, an urban farm, a playground, gardens 
(which today total more than 70), and a variety of other amenities.49 
 
 46. Housing Brass Tacks: Community Land Trusts, URB. OMNIBUS (Jan. 10, 2018), 
https://urbanomnibus.net/2018/01/community-land-trusts/ 
[https://perma.cc/R9PF-Q77Y]. 
 47. See generally PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR, STREET OF HOPE: THE FALL 
AND RISE OF AN URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD (1994). 
 48. To do this, DSNI, along with its community partners, approached the Boston 
Redevelopment Authority and requested eminent domain authority, which was 
granted by the City of Boston. This was due, in large part, to the support they 
received from the newly elected Mayor of Boston, Ray Flynn. With this authority, the 
DSNI purchased 60 acres of vacant land in the neighborhood, an area called the 
“Dudley Triangle,” and created a community land trust to ensure and preserve its 
affordability and prevent it from being captured by private developers. Id. 
 49. Jake Blumgart, Affordable Housing’s Forever Solution, NEXT CITY (Aug. 10, 
2015), https://nextcity.org/features/view/affordable-housings-forever-solution 
[https://perma.cc/D586-855S]. The housing now includes 77 cooperative living 
quarters, 55 rental apartments, and 96 individually owned homes. Individuals or 
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The Dudley Street CLT is one among a number of emerging CLTs 
across the country, largely to provide affordable housing but also 
other affordable community amenities and goods.50  A CLT is a 
nonprofit entity that owns the land and leases it for what it deems 
community-beneficial uses.51  CLTs operate most uniquely as 
stewards of shared resources by removing land from the speculative 
market and separating land ownership from land use.52  Through 
lease agreements, CLTs allow more residents to benefit from the 
land.53  For instance, CLTs often impose a resale formula tied to 
inflation as a condition of leasing land from the CLT, thus limiting the 
speculative potential of land.54  Through such resale formulas, CLTs 
keep this land affordable and accessible to future generations. 
A critical component of a CLT is its efforts to promote democratic 
governance, a key component of land stewardship and community 
control of land.  The governing board of a CLT is typically 
“tripartite” — an equal number of seats represented by users or 
people who lease the land from the CLT, residents from the 
surrounding community who do not lease land from the CLT, and the 
public and private sector (usually public officials, local funders, 
non-profit providers of housing or social services, and others).55  The 
 
families who wish to purchase one of Dudley’s affordable homes participate in a 
lottery system in order to ensure equal and fair access to the homes that come 
available. And once purchased, the homeowner pays a small lease fee for the land 
that the house sits upon, which continues to be owned by the CLT. The homeowner 
also agrees that if the home is ever sold, which is rare in the Dudley area, that the 
home must be sold at a cost determined by the formula used by DSNI’s CLT. This 
information was based on independent research and an interview with Mr. Juan 
Leyton, a leader in DSNI. Telephone Interview with Juan Leyton, Former Exec. Dir., 
Dudley St. Neighborhood Initiative (May 18, 2018). 
 50. See, e.g., Models and Best Practices: Community Land Trusts (CLTs), 
COMMUNITY-WEALTH.ORG, https://community-wealth.org/strategies/panel/clts/ 
models.html [https://perma.cc/5TAS-A3MM] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020). 
 51. JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, BURLINGTON ASSOCS. IN CMTY. DEV., STARTING A 
COMMUNITY LAND TRUST: ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL CHOICES (2007), 
https://community-wealth.org/sites/clone.community-wealth.org/files/downloads/tool-
burlington-startingCLT.pdf [https://perma.cc/YT2K-DCU7]. 
 52. See generally John Davis, Common Ground: Community-Owned Land as a 
Platform for Equitable and Sustainable Development, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (2017). 
 53. See Emily Thaden, The State of Shared-Equity Homeownership, 
SHELTERFORCE (May 7, 2018), https://shelterforce.org/2018/05/07/shared-equity/ 
[https://perma.cc/2TP9-NYLJ]. 
 54. See generally GROUNDED SOLUTIONS, RESALE FORMULA DESIGN (2011), 
https://groundedsolutions.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/12-Resale-Formula-Design.p
df [https://perma.cc/A5RU-GCKE]. 
 55. JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, COMMON GROUND: COMMUNITY LED DEVELOPMENT 
ON COMMUNITY OWNED LAND, ROOTS & BRANCHES 5 (2015). 
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governance structure of the typical CLT thus differs from the kind of 
closed, private governance of condos, co-ops, and other “common 
interest communities,” whose boards consist only of private property 
owners.56  CLTs transform what might otherwise be a collection of 
individuals owning property, as in a traditional condominium or 
housing cooperative, into a collaboratively governed nonprofit 
institution that stewards land and creates essential community goods 
in a way that ensures their long-term affordability and access for 
those vulnerable to being priced or urban areas today. 
For example, Dudley Square’s CLT board is represented by local 
and nearby residents who enforce lease agreements and other 
obligations of the lessors.57  The board is organized and run so that 
each cultural or ethnic grouping present in the Dudley community 
gets an equal voice.58  The Board has 35 seats, and of those 35, 20 are 
reserved for community residents, including an equal number of 
representatives of the four main ethnic groups inside the 
community.59  Residents alone vote for who gets to serve the two-year 
board term.60  Campaigns are door-to-door and face-to-face so that 
all residents get the opportunity to meet the members of their 
board.61  Once elected, the Board approves all decisions made by 
DSNI.62  All projects and campaigns have to be vetted and approved 
by the Board, but such decisions are always open to community input 
and participation.63 
CLTs resonate with what property scholars refer to as “governance 
property.”64  Governance property characterizes many (if not most) 
 
 56. See generally Meagan M. Ehlenz, Community Land Trusts and Limited 
Equity Cooperatives: A Marriage of Affordable Homeownership Models? (Lincoln 
Inst. of Land Policy, Working Paper No. WP14ME1, 2014). 
 57. Telephone Interview with Juan Leyton, supra note 49. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Of the 20 community seats, four seats are for Black residents, four are for 
Latinos, four are for residents with a Cape Verde heritage, four are for white 
residents, and four are for youth (ages 15–18) living in the community. Of the 
remaining seats: two are for community development organizations, two for local 
religious organizations, seven for partner organizations, and two for small businesses 
in the community. Once in place, these 33 members then elect two additional 
members from those who wanted to participate on the board but were not elected, 
for a total of 35. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See generally Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1853 (2012). 
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forms of private property ownership today in that such property is 
shared with multiple owners or users collectively making governance 
decisions about access, use, enjoyment, and transfer of property.65  
CLTs are a departure from the prevailing property ownership model, 
characteristic of Western legal culture, which aggregates all legal 
rights and entitlements in one owner.66  As property scholars have 
begun to recognize, the dominant Western model of property and 
resource ownership — the “fee simple”67 — looks more and more 
ill-fitting for the urbanized, interdependent world in which most 
people live.68  Endowing owners (public or private) with a monopoly 
on urban land and resources, this form of legal ownership “misses 
most of how urban property creates value,” namely through spatial 
relationships that result from the density and proximity characteristic 
of urbanization.69 
To meet the demands of contemporary urban land use instead 
requires a mix of approaches to mediate access to resources, 
particularly for those who have much less of them.  It requires, at the 
very least, embracing approaches that recognize relational property 
interests and resource governance in ways that advance access to 
urban resources for the most vulnerable and marginalized 
communities facing resource uncertainty and precarity.  Gaining or 
retaining access to these resources often involves a struggle or effort 
to recognize something akin to a collective property right to those 
resources for the urban poor.70  This is why we propose that cities like 
Chicago, where economic opportunities are concentrated, and urban 
land values are skyrocketing, encourage land and resource 
stewardship in urban communities.  Such an approach, which lies at 
the heart of the Co-City framework, suggests that it is possible to 
adapt and unbundle the legal entitlements to access71 and use 
property to satisfy normative commitments to social inclusion and 
distributive justice embraced by cities like Chicago. 
 
 65. Id. at 1856. 
 66. See generally Lee Fennell, Fee Simple Obsolete, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1457 
(2016). 
 67. “An interest in land that, being the broadest property interest allowed by law, 
endures until the current holder dies without heirs.” Fee Simple, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 68. See generally Alexander, supra note 64. 
 69. Fennell, supra note 66, at 1459–61. 
 70. Blomley, supra note 20, at 311. 
 71. See generally Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks, 32 ENVTL. 
L. 773, 789–91 (2002). 
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Drawing from Elinor Ostrom’s work on collective governance of 
shared or common resources, the Co-City Framework argues that 
residents should be able to use space, generate resources, and thrive, 
using urban land and resources that are available in their 
communities.72  The Co-Cities project, for example, is mapping 
examples from cities all over the world of the various ways that 
communities and users are co-managing and co-governing shared 
urban resources in different geographic, social and economic 
contexts.73  CLTs are one way that cities all over the world are 
experimenting with to ensure that critical urban resources remain 
accessible to individuals and communities by adapting private 
property entitlements to allow for resource stewardship.74  As Lisa 
Alexander has written, property stewardship is created by removing 
the profit motive and by allocating rights and responsibilities in a way 
that gives stewards decision-making control over resources in a 
manner similar to ownership, but without the emphasis on sole 
dominion and the individual exchange value of property.75  A 
resource stewardship framework grants control of, and access to, 
resources without formal “fee simple” title, without wealth 
maximization as a goal of property access, and “connects stewards to 
economic resources and social networks that maximize their 
self-actualization, privacy, human flourishing, and community 
participation.”76 
Other often used tools in the Co-City Framework, aside from 
community land trusts, include limited equity cooperatives (LECs).  
Much like CLTs, LECs also impose resale restrictions on interests.  In 
places like Washington, D.C., residents in long-term rental buildings 
have transformed their rental buildings into LECs to allow residents 
to remain in their communities as those neighborhoods undergo 
 
 72. See generally Elinor Ostrom, Unlocking Public Entrepreneurship and Public 
Economies (United Nations Univ., World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. DP2005/01, 2005). 
 73. What Is a Co-City, LABGOV, http://commoning.city/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q9UE-XRLY] (last visited Apr. 19, 2020). To date, the project has 
surveyed over 180 cities and over 500 policies and projects within them. Id. 
 74. See, e.g., John Krinsky & Paula Z. Segal, Stewarding the City as Commons: 
Parks Conservancies and Community Land Trusts, 22 CUNY L. REV. 270, 282–83 
(2019) (suggesting that CLTs “largely fulfill the demands of most of Ostrom’s design 
principles” for collectively managed common pool resources). 
 75. Lisa Alexander, Community in Property: Lessons from Tiny Homes Villages, 
104 MINN. L. REV. 385, 402 (2019). 
 76. Id. at 443. 
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gentrification.77  For years, tenants across that city worked together to 
fight threatened evictions, pool their money to purchase their 
apartment buildings, and exercise control over the increasingly scarce 
resource of affordable housing.78  To ensure the affordability of these 
buildings for future low- and moderate-income persons, the current 
residents created limited equity cooperative ownership structures.  
This allowed apartment dwellers to purchase shares in the co-op for 
little money, to pay low monthly co-op fees, and then to sell their 
shares for the same amount that they bought it plus a small amount of 
interest. 
Unlike CLTs, however, the mechanism to keep land uses 
affordable in an LEC occurs through a cooperative agreement 
restricting resale values, rather than a lease or deed restriction 
imposed by a nonprofit trust.79  Because LECs are a common or 
cooperative ownership regime, residents can rewrite the cooperative 
agreement and make private gains from speculation, as occurred in 
the hundreds of cooperative agreements in New York City (NYC) 
that converted to market-rate units.80  CLTs represent something 
quite distinct: a form of ownership for the common good in that the 
trust is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization that allows community 
control over land through a democratic governance structure.  The 
trust, as indicated above, is typically governed by residents in the 
surrounding community, leaseholders using the land on top of the 
trust, and the general public (represented by other stakeholders).81 
 
 77. See generally COAL. FOR NONPROFIT HOUS. & ECON. DEV., A STUDY OF 
LIMITED-EQUITY COOPERATIVES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (2004), 
https://community-wealth.org/sites/clone.community-wealth.org/files/downloads/repo
rt-cnhed.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3VH-UF3Z]. 
 78. See generally AMANDA HURON, CARVING OUT THE COMMONS: TENANT 
ORGANIZING AND HOUSING COOPERATIVES IN WASHINGTON, D.C. (2018). 
 79. Benjamin Schneider, CityLab University: Shared-Equity Homeownership, 
CITYLAB (Apr. 29, 2019), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/04/home-ownership-ideas-housing-co-ops-share
d-equity-land-trust/585658/ [https://perma.cc/2PR9-X2LG]. 
 80. See generally infra note 160. 
 81. Although not all land trusts operate like this. As a recent analysis has 
demonstrated, some land trusts are not about community control at all but rather 
chiefly about promoting individual homeownership. They lack the tripartite 
governance structure that has historically been one of the defining characteristics of 
land trusts. James DeFilippis et al., W(h)ither the Community in Community Land 
Trusts?, 40 J. URB. AFF. 755, 764 (2018) (noting that there is nothing inherent in the 
CLT model that requires a focus on housing and that. CLT land can be used for 
whatever purpose a community deems appropriate including, for example, 
development of housing, commercial space, industry, community and nonprofit 
centers, gardens, and parkland). 
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III. LAND STEWARDSHIP IN CHICAGO 
What does the above analysis mean for the Large Lots Program?  
Can administrators find or cultivate a CLT or LEC to steward a set of 
plots?  If not, might administrators sell to local residents, who intend 
to use it for community-beneficial uses?  Fortunately, Chicago 
already has experience with using land trusts to enable communities 
to steward land sustainably in a way that meets their needs and allows 
residents to benefit from any new development that comes into the 
neighborhood.  For instance, NeighborSpace is an independent, 
nonprofit land trust that preserves urban land, throughout the City of 
Chicago, for community gardens and open space. Created in 1996 by 
three government entities — the City of Chicago, the Chicago Park 
District, and the Forest Preserve District of Cook County — 
NeighborSpace now oversees 115 land-based sites located in 33 wards 
across the city, many of which are involved in community gardening 
projects.82 
NeighborSpace is unique among urban land trusts because it 
represents the kind of “nested” and multilevel governance structure 
that Elinor Ostrom found was often present in the community 
management of large-scale common pool natural resources.83  She 
documented the success of human communities that rely on natural 
resources to construct “institutions resembling neither the state nor 
the market to govern some resource systems with reasonable degrees 
of success over long periods of time.”84  In these instances, 
communities governed these resources through collaborative 
arrangements in which participants collectively decide how to 
produce value for the users and communities in which those resource 
are located.  These structures are critical for managing shared 
resources at a complex scale, like the city.  In these structures, 
self-organized small groups of users acting relatively autonomously 
but within a federated system that links them together. 
In the case of NeighborSpace, once a land grant is established, the 
government generally relinquishes operational control to the land 
trust, which itself transfers most of that control to the local gardeners 
 
 82. See generally Community-Managed Open Space, NEIGHBORSPACE, 
http://neighbor-space.org/ [https://perma.cc/ZJ86-49TG] (last visited Apr. 19, 2020). 
 83. Elinor Ostrom & Marco A. Janssen, Multi-Level Governance and Resilience 
of Social-Ecological Systems, in GLOBALISATION, POVERTY, AND CONFLICT: A 
“CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT” READER 250 (Springer Netherlands ed., 2005). 
 84. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 1 (1990). 
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and community groups that act as “stewards” over the land.85  In 
effect, NeighborSpace operates as a higher-level authority, while the 
real control and management over day-to-day affairs are handled by 
local members and groups in the community where the land is 
located.86  The rules of the land trust require collective governance 
over the acquired plots, which are prohibited from having a single 
lead gardener or overseer but must have multiple leaders overseeing 
its development, as well as community support and buy-in. 
By transferring multiple plots to CLTs at once, administering this 
program can still efficiently scale.  Boston took this approach when it 
transferred 1300 lots to the Dudley Square Community Land Trust.  
If there are not enough trusts, Chicago could develop more of them, 
just as NYC is doing under the de Blasio administration.87  NYC 
secured funding from Enterprise Community Partners to develop a 
variety of CLT projects.88  In late 2017, the City Council officially 
codified CLTs into law, allowing the city departments, such as the 
Department of Housing Preservation and Development, to enter into 
agreements with them.89  This legal recognition thus opened the way 
for the city to sell vacant public lots to CLTs. 
 
 85. Telephone Interview with Ben Helphand, Exec. Dir., Neighborspace (Apr. 18, 
2018); see also NEIGHBORSPACE, http://neighbor-space.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/B4Q7-KVR8] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020). 
 86. NeighborSpace, the land trust, handles the land purchases, performs 
environmental assessments and title work, holds the titles, easements or leases that it 
acquires, provides liability insurance and legal defense, and works to secure a 
dedicated water line for every parcel of land that it obtains. Nina Ignaczak, Chicago’s 
NeighborSpace Preservers Urban Land in the City for Community Gardens and 
Open Space, SEEDSTOCK (Sept. 10, 2013), 
http://seedstock.com/2013/09/10/chicagos-neighborspace-preserves-urban-land-in-the-
city-for-community-gardens-and-open-space/ [https://perma.cc/NQB3-FM65]. It also 
provides some guidance and other forms of support, “including a signage template, a 
list of gardeners’ rights and responsibilities, and a tool lending library,” and it acts as 
the liaison between the government and the participating community groups. Id. 
However, it is not involved in the day-to-day management of the land plots, which is 
left to the community, and plot users, in what is described as a “non-hierarchical” 
governance structure that prevents the centralization of power in any one individual’s 
(or one group’s) hands. Telephone Interview with Ben Helphand, supra note 85. 
 87. Abigail Savitch-Lew, The NYC Community Land Trust Movement Want to 
Go Big, CITYLIMITS (Jan. 8, 2018), 
https://citylimits.org/2018/01/08/the-nyc-community-land-trust-movement-wants-to-go
-big/ [https://perma.cc/B46H-R97K]. 
 88. Press Release, NY Attorney General, Attorney General James Announces $8 
Million in Grants to Fund Affordable Housing (Jan. 15, 2020), 
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/attorney-general-james-announces-8-million-gran
ts-fund-affordable-housing [https://perma.cc/QGV2-YKVT]. 
 89. Savitch-Lew, supra note 87. 
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Similarly, many prominent German cities have explicitly formed 
incubators for cooperatives.90  The city of Leipzig, for instance, 
provides not only free financial consultations but also connects 
vulnerable segments of the population with each other so they can 
form housing cooperatives.  For example, Leipzig’s Network for 
Multigenerational Living helps families and seniors form 
multigenerational housing cooperatives and learn from best practices 
from prior housing cooperative entrepreneurs.91  Munich, as another 
example, not only favors cooperative housing in its land sales but 
incentivizes them.  It offers 20–40% of city-owned land at reduced 
prices to cooperative housing groups, viewing them as critical 
partners in the creation of permanently affordable housing.92  For 
cooperatives that meet additional social purpose goals, the city of 
Munich also reduces borrowing costs for these developers.93 
One may argue that incorporating these conditions will harm the 
demand for lots in the Large Lots Program.  Yet, already 1250 lots 
have been sold in just five years.94  Having validated demand for 
these lots, the City of Chicago can now afford to ensure that lot sales 
drive the city’s long-term goals forward.  A stewardship-based 
proposal would not even be radical in the context of Chicago’s policy 
framework.  In fact, it formalizes an existing process.  Before 
Gutierrez’s lot was sold by the Large Lots Program, a local alderman 
representing her supported transferring ownership of the garden to a 
local community land trust.  Because there was no formal process to 
include the transfer of ownership to a CLT, however, “wires were 
crossed,” and the Large Lots Program administrators did not transfer 
ownership to a CLT. 
Community leaders argue that a stewardship-based model could 
address scenarios like Gutierrez’s “by empowering residents and 
community members with the agency to execute decisions over land 
 
 90. Kathryn Reynolds, Lessons from Germany’s Shared Housing Models: 
Expanding Ownership Opportunities and Improving the Built Environment, 
HOUSING MATTERS (Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://housingmatters.urban.org/articles/lessons-germanys-shared-housing-models-ex
panding-ownership-opportunities-and-improving [https://perma.cc/MY9W-YT5D]. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Daniel Wu, Are Community Land Trusts the Answer to Chicago’s Large Lots 
Program Issues?, SHAREABLE (Dec. 10, 2019), 
https://www.shareable.net/are-community-land-trusts-the-answer-to-chicagos-large-lo
ts-program-issues/ [https://perma.cc/8XU2-PBEX]. 
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use, democratically.”95  Indeed, the Co-City Framework’s toolkit of 
CLTs and LECs may better match the purposes that are driving key 
community leaders who created the program with the City of 
Chicago.  As we saw in Boston’s Dudley Square CLT, when applied 
to public land sales, a stewardship framework promotes principles of 
justice, solidarity, and deep collaboration in its work to ensure that 
cities are not constructed by a select few property owners, and instead 
meet the needs of all.  When more residents benefit from their use of 
land, cities unleash the creativity of their residents.  Cross-cutting 
relationships are built, communities thrive, and sustainable economies 
develop.  A stewardship approach to putting vacant land back into 
productive use for urban communities can unlock what Ostrom called 
“public entrepreneurship” — opening the public sector to innovation 
in providing, producing, and encouraging the co-production of 
essential goods and services at the local level without privatizing 
those goods.96  Cities can support communities’ productive use of 
available urban assets, like land, providing them with the necessary 
tools to become empowered agents in the regeneration of their 
neighborhoods.  These tools include public policies, program policies 
like the Large Lot Program, support of community land trusts, and 
fostering connections between active networks such as community 
gardeners across a city, just as NeighborSpace does. 
IV. SUPPORTING AND FINANCING URBAN LAND STEWARDSHIP: A 
CHALLENGE TO SCALING THE CO-CITY APPROACH 
With the goal of revitalizing neighborhoods with vacant lots, 
dozens of cities and countries are administering schemes reminiscent 
of Chicago’s Large Lots Program, including New York,97 
Philadelphia,98 Dallas,99 and Spain.100  Other cities, like Detroit, have 
 
 95. Online Interview with Ivan Cazarin, supra note 45. 
 96. Elinor Ostrom, Unlocking Public Entrepreneurship and Public Economies 
(UNU World Inst. for Dev. of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 2005/01, 2005), 
https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/dp2005-01.pdf 
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De Blasio Became Mayor, CURBED N.Y. (Mar. 13, 2018, 2:00 PM) 
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map [https://perma.cc/E8EH-XAKD]. 
 98. Jake Blumgart, City Selling Vacant Lots with Eye to ‘Social Impact’, PLAN 
PHILLY (Nov. 29, 2018), 
https://whyy.org/articles/city-selling-vacant-lots-with-eye-to-social-impact/ 
[https://perma.cc/HTA9-JYC7]. 
 99. Julieta Chiquillo, From Empty Lots to Affordable Homes: Dallas Vows to 
Clean up its Act After Investigation Found Abuse, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 10, 
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independent land banks manage vacant parcels, clear title, and sell 
the land back to private owners.101 
The temptation, and challenge, for cities with available, vacant, or 
unutilized land is that such land is one of the few vehicles many cities 
have to generate additional revenue.  Hong Kong, for instance, sells 
its high-demand vacant lots to the highest bidder for hundreds of 
millions or even billions,102 thereby funding local city operations.103  
Local city governments in the United Kingdom have sold over 12,000 
public libraries, universities, parks, and other public spaces to private 
owners to garner funds, after years of central government austerity.104  
More drastically, countries like Honduras are creating “charter 
cities.”105  They sell not only lots of vacant land to private developers 
for millions, but also contract out the legal regime to govern related 
civil and criminal matters through an independent commission.106 
Even if city administrators around the world agree to consider 
selling vacant land to a CLT before private owners, these nonprofit 
entities may struggle to finance the development of the land into 
community assets and to sustain them as affordable.107  CLTs and 
LECs have struggled to access financing for blanket mortgages or 
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interest share loans, given the lack of familiarity with these models.108  
Cities, however, are not without solutions and tools to facilitate 
community control of land or shared equity housing in disadvantaged 
communities through their support of CLTS and LECs. 
To address the financial barriers Co-City developments have faced, 
we offer a menu of options that city leaders and community-based 
entrepreneurs can use to make such developments more feasible.  
These strategies are explored in turn, each strategy ending with an 
example of how it can boost the goals of the Co-City Framework, 
generally, and land stewardship tools like CLTs and LECs 
specifically. 
A. Zoning and Land Use Regulatory Incentives 
Cities can incentivize the development of CLTs, LECs, and other 
Co-City institutional mechanisms by incentivizing specific uses using 
regulation.  Incentives can include allowances for mixed-use 
development,109 parking lot reductions, investment into nearby public 
transit, tax benefits, tax increment financing, fast-track review, social 
impact bonds, inspection, and utility connection, fee waivers, 
narrower street widths, and the like.  These can make stewardship 
approaches more financially attractive, enabling these developments 
to access more financing from lenders.110  Ultimately, with incentives, 
more permanently affordable units can be built. 
As an example, take an incentive to increase the density of an area, 
such as a density bonus.  As part of an inclusionary zoning program, 
for-profit developers are able to build more units, and add more 
floors, when they meet local governments’ goals for more affordable 
housing.  Instead of allowing all developers to benefit from such 
programs, cities can limit them to CLTs or LECs to ensure that more 
permanently affordable housing units are built.  Taking traditional 
affordable housing development as an analogy, being able to build 
more floors or more units on the same lot (by relaxing minimum unit 
sizes), more residents can pool their resources together, access 
 
 108. Thaden, supra note 53. 
 109. Jena Tesse Fox, JLL Cites Mixed-Use Development for Profitability, HOTEL 
MGMT. (Sept. 17, 2019), 
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[https://perma.cc/94HH-CS4D] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020). 
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affordable units, and achieve economies of scale.111  As a result, such 
a move would likely drastically increase the financial viability of 
LECs.112 
Cities that limit regulatory advantages to these kinds of equitable 
developments exist around the world.  Analogous efforts exist in 
German cities, as discussed above.113  Munich, for instance, offers 
special regulatory incentives to cooperative housing, regularly 
favoring these cooperative developers and offering 20–40% discounts 
on public land sales.114 
Similarly, Boulder suspended a tax incentive for most developers, 
except those that met public-service goals.115  The tax incentive — the 
Qualified Opportunity Zones program116 — was designed to promote 
investment in distressed areas.117  Concerned that the program would 
not meet its intended goal to benefit residents directly, the city 
suspended all applications for these tax benefits, except for projects 
that would also directly benefit underserved residents.  For instance, 
it allowed the city-owned Boulder Junction project to continue, which 
was a mixed-use development with significant affordable housing 
built on top of a regional bus transit hub.118 
The major drawback of these strategies is political feasibility.  
Continuing with the example of density bonuses for affordable 
housing, cities, regions, and recently “yes in my backyard” (or 
YIMBY) advocates may want these to build more housing.  But such 
upzoning threatens existing homeowners, who want less density and 
traffic that would arise from more density (also called “not in my 
backyard,” or NIMBY, advocates).119  From the other end of the 
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housing spectrum, traditional housing affordability advocates also 
may oppose upzoning because they fear that it would displace local 
residents, often favoring expensive market- or luxury-rate housing.  
Despite having some overlapping goals to build more housing, 
YIMBY and traditional housing affordability advocates have sparred 
on bills such as California’s proposal to upzone areas around 
transit.120 
In contrast, a targeted upzoning proposal like the type proposed 
above may thus in fact be even more politically feasible than 
traditional upzoning bills.  As the YIMBYs prefer, the proposal 
would favor upzoning and the creation of more housing units to 
address the lack of supply.  But to address concerns that upzoning 
would displace local residents,121 targeted upzoning would limit these 
benefits to developers who will steward the property, using CLTs and 
LECs.  These units would also be built affordably-by-design so that 
each unit, albeit smaller, is more cost-effective, allowing more to 
participate and pool their resources.  Targeted upzoning may build 
common ground between YIMBYs and traditional affordability 
advocates. 
The creation of new coalitions has been found to be key to housing 
innovations.  For instance, researchers point to a coalition of young 
YIMBY advocates and racial justice organizers in sparking the end of 
Minneapolis’ exclusionary, single-family zoning.122  Coalitions 
between labor and tenant rights activists helped make Community 
Benefit Agreements in the early 2000s a success.123  These agreements 
require developers to provide affordable housing and local hiring to 
the local community in exchange for community support of 
megaprojects like Los Angeles’ L.A. Live.124 
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While more density raises gentrification concerns, favoring CLTs 
and LECs blunts the threat.125  Potential appreciation and rising rents 
serve properties stewarded for permanent affordability, and other 
community amenity uses.126  CLTs and LECs can capture rising land 
values and cycle them back into sustaining these land uses and 
keeping them affordable and accessible.127  These tools, in fact, 
promote what Majora Carter has called “self-gentrification,” a 
contested idea but one that supports enabling longtime residents of 
revitalizing neighborhoods to be in control of community 
development and the kinds of amenities that address their needs.128 
B. Alternative Financing Sources for Stewarded Developments 
Stewarded developments can also consider alternative financing 
sources that allow them to access more forms of capital.  These 
sources are likely willing to take lower returns in exchange for a 
public good. 
It is worth discussing why financing gaps in permanently affordable 
housing development exist. Traditional lenders face regulatory or 
operational roadblocks in financing projects seen as too risky or 
unconventional.  For one, lenders rely on a process called 
securitization129 to pool mortgages of a similar type and sell pieces of 
that pool to investors.  While this spreads credit risk, pooling requires 
homogeneity in the underlying pooled assets — which is in tension 
with the Co-City Framework’s aforementioned notion of pooling 
resources.  Furthermore, capital market investors penalize 
unstandardized assets, harming liquidity and exposing lenders to 
higher risk.130 
The sector of “entrepreneurial finance” seeks to address this gap 
by helping entrepreneurs, such as developers, obtain financing from 
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lenders subject to fewer of the restrictions mentioned above for 
unconventional projects.131  Crowdfunding is a relevant financing 
mechanism for expensive projects due to its ability to pool the funds 
from numerous individuals into one large project.132 
Crowdfunding is a valuable tool for Oakland’s Permanent Real 
Estate Cooperative (PREC).  PREC describes itself as a “movement 
cooperative.”  It seeks not only to provide housing, but also to help 
members transform their neighborhoods and systems of finance and 
land ownership.133  In addition to using crowdfunding, PREC 
combines features from both CLT and LECs, with a strong focus on 
social movement organizing and participatory governance.134  About 
25%135 of its $200,000 maintenance fund budget is covered by sales to 
non-residents of cooperative shares, which return a dividend of 1.5% 
to investors, far below the 7% commercial average.136  Investment 
terms, furthermore, are structured to maintain the cooperative’s 
mission. For instance, shares are non-transferable, cooperatives have 
five years to buy back shares when investors need to sell, and 
resident-owners get right of first refusal to acquire the cooperative’s 
properties.137 
Yet similar cooperative-like developments that use crowdfunding 
will find that the amount of money they can raise is limited.  Terms 
like PREC’s may not be attractive for many retail investors, limiting 
the pool of investors and ultimately funds that nontraditional, 
nonprofit, or limited equity developers can raise.  For low- or 
middle-class non-resident investors, earning 1.5% on your investment 
may be unsound.  They likely will rather invest more of their portfolio 
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in high-interest savings or tax-advantaged retirement accounts that 
deliver better returns with less risk, especially due to Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation insurance.  Beyond that, investing much of 
their portfolio in low-returning financial products like PREC’s shares 
may harm these investors’ ability to save adequately for retirement or 
rainy days, like medical emergencies. 
To address some of these issues, online platforms to support 
Co-City developments such as CLTs or LECs can help expand the 
pool of investors for which these low-returning yet mission-oriented 
financial products are attractive.  In contrast to one-off sales of 
cooperative stock, like PREC’s, a platform would aggregate many 
Co-City projects in one place, filtered by a variety of key investment 
criteria.  These include size, geography, return, and measures of social 
impact (for instance, the Community Development Financial 
Institution, or CDFI, Assessment and Ratings System138). 
For would-be Co-City developers, this platform would compile 
potential financing sources.139  Eligibility filters and a standardized 
application — which could double as a template to understand best 
practices for legal, financial, and other operations — allow these 
developers to source financing more quickly.  Several housing 
platforms like Cobuy140 and UsurpPower141 ease these transaction 
costs for specific markets, such as shared mortgages and energy 
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retrofits, respectively.  Demand for such a way to navigate numerous 
financing opportunities is clear. Organizations from the Global Fund 
for Cities’ Development142 to Grounded Solutions143 have created 
databases of possible funding sources for Co-City-type developments, 
like CLT and LECs. 
Specific types of institutional investors may be attracted to such 
platforms because of the search and information costs of finding 
worthwhile investments.  CRA-motivated banks, for instance, need to 
invest in low- and moderate-income (LMI) geographies or find loans 
originated by certified community development lenders, such as 
community development financial institutions.  Currently, due to 
search and information costs, many banks simply invest in mutual 
funds of loans that service their LMI geographies to meet their 
obligation, despite the costly nature of the convenience.144  Other 
smaller institutional investors, such as municipal pension funds, 
foundations, and high-income individuals, will also benefit from a 
platform in which they can easily find investments that meet their 
investment and impact criteria.145 
There is precedent for raising financing through platforms to fund 
stewarded developments, such as the platform Faithify’s offering of 
the Lucy Stone Cooperative.146  Faithify raised $11,358 in donations 
in two months to help the Lucy Stone Cooperative (LSC) afford a 
down payment.147  While LSC is a group-equity cooperative, LSC 
members do not accrue individual equity to keep rent permanently 
affordable.148  In that way, it is a stewardship rather than 
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ownership-based governance system, like LECs.149  Furthermore, to 
assist philanthropists, projects on Faithify can be filtered by type of 
project and feature clear descriptions of key criteria.150  Other 
crowdfunding platforms for mission-driven real estate-related 
investments include Nico, which reduces the barriers to entry for local 
neighbors and renters to invest in real estate in their neighborhood,151 
Small Change, which allows users to filter by the development’s level 
of social impact,152 and BlocPower, which focuses on energy 
retrofits.153 
C. Strategic Partnerships and Investments 
While the Co-City Framework explicitly considers both CLTs and 
LECs as key pooling mechanisms, when these two forms work 
together, they can unlock more financial opportunities. For one, 
LECs allow residents to pool resources to drive down costs and also 
secure a blanket mortgage,154 using a physical building as collateral. 
R50, one “building group” (or baugruppen) in Austria, for 
instance, has been able to live in units nearly 20% cheaper155 than 
comparable units.  Because the group self-directed the development 
of its own building, it avoided having to hire a developer, which 
would otherwise require a 10–20%156 return on investment on top of 
the cost of the building.  Furthermore, by organizing a community to 
live in the building, the baugruppen also avoided marketing and sales 
costs, which can consume up to 10% of total development budgets.157  
Finally, this baugruppen was able to obtain more financing for its 
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building by pooling together initial down payments and proving its 
interest in the project to lenders.158 
R50 would also benefit from a partnership with a CLT. By 
separating the ownership of land from the building, the cost to own an 
interest in a cooperative is lowered, as a cooperative resident does not 
need as much money to purchase land.159  Finally, both the 
cooperative and land trust form offer distinct financial benefits that 
can be pooled together.  Cooperative corporations have an enhanced 
ability to take multiple forms of capital, unlike trusts, which are 
typically 501(c)(3)s.160  Yet, since 501(c)(3)s often qualify for special 
tax exemptions,161 which can thus reduce the partnership’s total 
operational costs and financial viability. 
Other strategic partnerships Co-City developers should consider 
are those with traditional community development corporations 
(CDCs).  There are quite a few benefits for both parties, as evidenced 
by the Banana Kelly CDC’s partnership with the East Harlem 
CLT.162  First, some CDCs have considered ways to move their rental 
portfolios into land trusts to maintain permanent affordability.  “For 
example, the Banana Kelly Community Improvement Association is 
developing a land trust to govern their properties while mobilizing 
broader community support for creating additional land trusts in the 
Bronx area of New York City.”163  By holding these rental portfolios 
in a land trust, CLTs can have the “minimum income to allow 
financing to work,” notes Banana Kelly’s executive director, Harold 
DeRienzo.164 
Some CDCs are part of large housing portfolios, which can create 
an unprecedented scale for CLTs.  One example is the Joint 
Ownership Entity (JOE), of which the Banana Kelly CDC is a part, 
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which holds nearly 3000 affordable units.165  The JOE allows CDCs to 
assign ownership interests in their property to an umbrella entity, and 
receive membership interest and board seats. The JOE, in turn, 
manages the assets and provides more consistent revenues and a 
larger balance sheet for future development projects.166 
Given that one of the core principles of the Co-City Framework is 
pooling, there is a lot to be learned from how real estate investment 
cooperatives (REICs) allow local residents to invest financially to 
collectively buy, rehab, and manage commercial and residential 
property in the community.167  Strategic, pooled investments allow 
these entities to raise capital and investment assets as collateral to 
purchase more properties. 
The Northeast Investment Cooperative (NEIC) in Minneapolis 
provides an example.168  In 2012, residents pooled their money to 
acquire a discount mattress warehouse as a group, which has now 
been converted into a thriving bike repair shop, craft beer brewery, 
and bakery.  When a building owner agrees to sell, NEIC signs a 
letter of intent with that owner, raises financing from new and 
existing members, and also obtains capital from a community bank.  
A key aspect of loan analysis is that the borrower has sufficient equity 
and assets to cover the down payment and associated renovations.169  
Due to the collection of thriving assets it has developed, NEIC has 
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successfully obtained financing for multiple buildings from local 
banks.170 
Similar work has been proposed and prototyped by Cooperative 
Community Investment (CCI)171 and the cooperative housing 
association Mietshauser Syndikat.172  As CCI explains, assets the 
REIC collects can be used to provide “dividends from income 
generated through commercial rents, strategic acquisitions or 
proceeds from CCI sales” and create larger purchases that reduce the 
cost of basic needs, like food and utilities.173 
Ultimately, by encouraging the use of regulatory incentives to 
promote more pooling and affordability-by-design, alternative 
financing sources, and strategic partnerships, city leaders and 
community-based entrepreneurs can scale stewarded developments 
even in areas with high land values. 
CONCLUSION 
A key component of the Co-City Framework is the creation of 
common goods collectively governed and controlled by the 
communities that they serve.  These goods are made possible by local 
policies that allow residents to access and utilize the property of the 
city, that we all share, and through the pooling of resources, money, 
and time to develop or construct those goods. 
This Essay investigated one city’s policy — the Large Lots Program 
— as an example of the kind of program that can be adapted or 
redesigned with stewardship in mind.  The piece then explored why 
Co-City’s applicability does not end with the Chicago example.  It has 
relevance to a variety of public land sales happening across the world. 
Yet the Co-City Framework will have trouble applying to areas 
where land is cost-prohibitive.174  In these cities, governments often 
sell land in order to generate revenue — not just revitalize 
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neighborhoods.175  In order to push the Co-City Framework further, 
this Essay ended with an investigation into three general strategies 
Co-City projects can use to support and finance their work.  These 
include creating incentives in zoning and land use laws, encouraging 
the identification of alternative financing sources, and launching 
strategic partnerships to build leverageable assets. 
Beyond these strategies, it is worth briefly discussing legal reforms 
or policies that can further enable the Co-City Framework to become 
a powerful intervention into exclusionary patterns of urban 
development.  Following Minnesota’s lead, states might consider 
securities exemptions that allow cooperatives to raise capital from 
their members and exceed the purchase of membership shares.176  
Rules like this helped Minnesota’s thriving cooperative sector.177  The 
PREC in California, too, was able to raise more money from its 
surrounding community due to a 2015 state law allowing cooperatives 
to raise more than $350 from their members.178 
While a focus on finance seems at odds from the community-driven 
efforts seen in Co-City developments, they go hand-in-hand.  Many of 
the accounts above, from PREC to the NEIC, show that efforts to 
build financial feasibility involve community organizing so that local 
residents can increase community control over their neighborhood.  
Raising financing means listening to the concerns and needs of a 
variety of local stakeholders who are invested in the outcome of the 
project.  Raising financing means coalition-buildings work with 
community development corporations and other diverse actors in the 
ecosystem, such as policymakers, to push for new policies.  Raising 
financing is itself a means to understand and partner with 
communities to build more equitable and empowering communities. 
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